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Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems typically include monitoring of unemployed work­
ers and punitive sanctions for those who do not comply with job search requirements (see 
e.g. OECD, 2000, for an overview). Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2004) 
is the ﬁrst published study of the causal effect of a punitive sanction on the transition rate 
from non-employment to employment. Since then, a range of similar studies has been car­
ried out for different countries and time periods, see Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw 
(2005, 2006), for overviews. These studies do not consider the effect of a sanction on the 
type of job accepted. From a welfare point of view as well from the point of view of the 
unemployed individual, such effects are important.  If the job accepted after a sanction 
is similar to the job accepted in the counterfactual situation of no sanction, then severe 
sanctions and intensive monitoring have less adverse long-run effects than if the former 
job is often worse than the latter.  This relates to the more general issue of how steeply 
beneﬁts should decline as a function of the elapsed unemployment duration, to balance 
moral hazard with the likelihood that unemployed individuals are driven into sub-optimal 
job matches (see e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000). 
In this paper we address the effects of sanctions on the quality of the job that is ac­
cepted. We distinguish between effects on the wage and on working hours (speciﬁcally, 
full-time versus part-time). Wages and hours are potentially relevant margins along which 
unemployed individuals make job acceptance decisions. We use register data covering the 
full Swedish population over 1999–2004. This includes several hundreds of thousands of 
unemployment spells. The register data also include information on a large range of back­
ground characteristics of the individual, his/her household, and his/her local labor market 
conditions.  If a spell is observed to end in a transition to work then in many cases we 
observe the above-mentioned job characteristics. Notice that observation of a wage rate 
is very unusual in register data on employment or, indeed, in annual longitudinal panel 
survey data.  Such data typically only record annual income or annual earnings, which 
are composite measures based on both wages and hours worked.  Our data enable us to 
distinguish between effects on wages and effects on hours. 
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ployment may fade away swiftly as individuals have the opportunity to search on the job 
and make transitions to jobs with better characteristics. We investigate this by examining 
the job conditions that prevail several years after the sanction.  Moreover, we examine 
whether individuals make job acceptance decisions after a sanction that are more or less 
irreversible. Speciﬁcally, we observe the occupation of the accepted job, and we observe 
to what extent this differs from the occupation of the pre-unemployment job. On average, 
acceptance of a job with a lower occupational level involves a larger loss of human capital 
than acceptance of a job in the same occupation. This loss becomes irreversible as human 
capital depreciates over time. It may therefore be more difﬁcult for the individual to move 
out of a bad job match if the job has a lower occupational level. This makes it important 
to know whether sanctions often lead to a match in a lower occupational level. By mea­
suring the required number of years of education for each occupation, we can quantify the 
human capital loss due to the occupational downgrading caused by a sanction.  Because 
of the existence of separate educational tracks, this is likely to be a lower bound of the 
true loss. 
The empirical analyses are based on the “timing of events” approach (see e.g. Abbring 
and Van den Berg, 2003). This involves the estimation of duration models for the duration 
to job exit and the duration until treatment (i.e., a sanction), exploiting random variation 
in the timing of the treatment and taking into account that treatment assignment may be 
selective in that the durations may be affected by related unobserved determinants. This 
is the standard approach in the literature on sanction effects. Indeed, one may claim that 
punitive treatments provide a best case application for this approach. This is, ﬁrst of all, 
because the moment at which an individual is caught is by deﬁnition unanticipated by the 
individual, so that the “no anticipation” assumption on the joint distribution of counter­
factuals is satisﬁed. Accordingly, the time until treatment. is to some extent driven by an 
element that is random from the individual’s point of view. Secondly, unconfoundedness 
assumptions are almost by deﬁnition likely to be invalid, because individuals can only 
logically display inadmissible behavior if this behavior or its determinants are not fully 
observable in standard registers.  To address effects of dynamically assigned treatments 
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with dynamic selection due to unobserved heterogeneity even if the assignment process 
is randomized (see Ham and LaLonde, 1996, and Abbring and Van den Berg, 2005). 
In addition to the analysis of sanction effects on job characteristics, our paper makes 
three other major contributions to the literature (for convenience, we refer to these as 
contributions 2, 3 and 4). To understand the importance of two of these, we should start 
by pointing out two special features of the Swedish UI monitoring system.  First, the 
monitoring of an unemployed individual is carried out by the same case worker who also 
provides job search assistance to the individual. This case worker is the only person who 
can take the initiative to give a sanction.  This is a marked difference with monitoring 
in other countries, which is typically carried out by agencies that are distinct from the 
agencies providing job search assistance to the unemployed. Secondly, after inﬂow into 
UI, monitoring focuses on job offer decisions, in the sense that unemployed individuals 
are not supposed to reject suitable job offers.  This is also in contrast to monitoring in 
other countries, which typically focuses on search effort, as measured by the number of 
applications sent out or indicators of the willingness to adhere to job search guidelines. 
The second major contribution of the paper is that we study a policy change in the 
monitoring system during the period under observation. Before February 5, 2001, the only 
possible punishment rate was a rate of 100% (i.e., complete UI beneﬁts withdrawal) for a 
certain amount of time. After that, the default rate was 25%. The underlying motivation 
for this change was that the personal connection between the case worker and the person 
he/she was supposed to help made it difﬁcult for the former to propose a punishment 
that amounted to the full withdrawal of the latter’s income. It was felt that more modest 
sanctions would increase the threat effect of sanctions and thereby would increase the 
exit rate to work for those not (yet) punished.  The decision to change the punishment 
rate was made and announced only shortly before the implementation date.  In theory, 
this provides a “regression discontinuity” that the analyst may use to identify the threat 
effect of a monitoring system. With our population-level data, we aim to pursue this. We 
examine changes in sanction rates and the exit rate out of unemployment before and after 
the policy change. 
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stood by resorting to a job search theoretical model framework.  The third major contri­
bution of the paper is that we develop and analyze a theoretical model with monitoring of 
job offer decisions in the presence of wage variation. The theoretical predictions can be 
contrasted to those from a model with monitoring of job search effort or search intensity. 
We ﬁnd some qualitative differences, and these by itself contribute to our understanding 
of efﬁcient policy.  Notice that monitoring of offer decisions increases the relevance of 
studying effects on job quality, because rejected offers typically concern jobs with a low 
job quality. 
The fourth major contribution is methodological. “Timing of events” models are usu­
ally estimated with random samples from the inﬂow into the state of interest, by maxi­
mum likelihood.  However, in the case of a rare treatment, the random sample needs to 
include many individuals in order to obtain a sufﬁcient number of individuals who are 
observed to be treated.  Estimation with very large samples is computationally demand­
ing.  We therefore propose to estimate the models with endogenously stratiﬁed samples, 
using weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood (WESML). Accordingly, the 
sample we use contains all individuals observed to get a sanction, plus a subsample of the 
other individuals. This estimation method has not yet been used in the context of bivariate 
dependent-duration models (see Ridder, 1986, and Amemiya and Yu, 2006, for applica­
tions to univariate duration analyses with endogenously stratiﬁed samples). The method 
requires certain aggregate population statistics, but recall that we observe the complete 
population of Sweden. 
The main empirical result of the paper is that, on average, sanctions increase the tran­
sition rate into work with 23%, but cause individuals to accept jobs with a lower hourly 
wage and less working hours per week. The estimated average reduction in the accepted 
wage is almost 4%. In addition, sanctions causally increase the likelihood of the accep­
tance of a job at a lower occupational level, incurring a permanent human capital loss 
that is on average equivalent to at least some weeks of formal education. The theoretical 
analysis suggests that these adverse effects can be partly (but not fully) prevented if the 
system of job-offer-decision monitoring is replaced by a system of search-effort moni-
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current Swedish system does not exert substantial “ex ante” or threat effects of monitor­
ing on the job exit rate of not-yet punished unemployed individuals. It is plausible that a 
system of search-effort monitoring that is not carried out by the case worker who provides 
job search assistance would actually create a larger threat effect.  Methodologically, our 
paper suggests that WESML with an endogenously stratiﬁed sample containing all treated 
is a very useful method for the estimation of causal effects of rare endogenous events on 
duration outcomes, if one has access to a large data set and population statistics. In par­
ticular, it is very useful for the estimation of dynamically assigned treatments on duration 
outcomes if treatments are rare and one has population-level register data. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional setting. It 
discusses the Swedish UI system and the role of monitoring and sanctions in that system. 
It also describes the monitoring policy reforms in our observation window.  Section 3 
provides the theoretical job search framework and derives theoretical predictions. Section 
4 gives a detailed description of the data. In Section 5 we discuss the empirical approach 
and the WESML estimation method. Section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 
concludes. 
2  Unemployment insurance 
2.1  Unemployment insurance entitlement 
This subsection describes the relevant features of the UI system on January 1, 2001.  In 
Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 we discuss the monitoring system and the corresponding policy 
change in 2001.  For a detailed description of other UI reforms during our observation 
window see e.g. Olli Segendorf (2003). These are mostly reforms in local features of the 
function from the labor market history to the UI level. 
An unemployed (part-time or full-time) individual in Sweden is entitled to UI beneﬁts 
if a range of conditions are fulﬁlled.  First, the individual must have been member of 
an unemployment insurance fund for at least 12 months and should have had a job for 
at least six months in the past 12 months.  Secondly, (s)he needs to be registered at the 
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hours a day and at least 17 hours per week. Further, (s)he must state that (s)he is actively 
searching for employment. 
Those who fulﬁll these conditions are entitled to wage-related UI beneﬁts.  These 
amount to 80% of the average earnings during the latest six months of employment, with 
a ﬂoor and a ceiling. In the beginning of 2001 these were SEK 270 (≈ e25) and SEK 580 
a day (≈ e55) per day. Individuals who have not been a member of an UI fund for at least 
12 months may qualify for the Unemployment Assistance (UA) system.  Compensation 
in UA is unrelated to previous earnings and the generosity of UA is much lower than 
UI. In our analysis we restrict attention to UI recipients.  To retain UI during a spell of 
unemployment, the individual needs to remain eligible. 
In 2001, the entitlement duration of UI beneﬁts was 300 days for everyone.  The 
beneﬁts could either be collected continuously or with breaks in between the collection 
periods.  If the individual ﬁnds a job and retains it for six months then he qualiﬁes for 
new entitlement period. The individual also continues to collect UI beneﬁts while being 
enrolled in a speciﬁc labor market program (the activity guarantee).1  UI beneﬁts are 
mainly ﬁnanced by proportional pay-roll taxes. 
2.2  Monitoring and sanctions 
The monitoring of an unemployed individual is carried out by the case worker of the PES 
ofﬁce. This is the same person as the case worker who provides job search assistance to 
the individual. The case worker’s identity usually does not change during the unemploy­
ment spell. 
The case worker is supposed to examine whether the individual’s job search behavior 
is in accordance to the UI guidelines.  This concerns the veriﬁcation that the individual 
has not rejected suitable job offers. The case worker is the only person who can take the 
initiative to give a sanction. A sanction is a beneﬁts reduction for a limited time as a pun­
1Case workers assess the need for program participation if individuals are close to the end of their entitlement 
period.  If such need is found then the individual is assigned to the “activity guarantee” which includes 
different monitoring activities. 
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the course of an unemployment spell that the unemployed individual does not violate the 
UI entitlement conditions in the ﬁrst place. This concerns, for example, unreported em­
ployment.  If the individual is deemed non-eligible then he is not registered anymore as 
being unemployed. Moreover, his UI beneﬁts payment is terminated immediately and for 
an indeﬁnite period of time.3 
The assignment of a sanction involves a number of stages.  First, the case worker at 
the PES ofﬁce observes an infringement.  The employment ofﬁce then prepares a report 
to the unemployment insurance fund, stating the infringement but not the sort of sanction 
it thinks is suitable. The unemployed individual is informed about the report and is given 
the opportunity to comment on his behavior.  In practice, case workers may contact the 
unemployed individual before preparing the report, to prevent that the apparent infringe­
ment was due to a misunderstanding.  A copy of the report is sent to the central public 
unemployment ofﬁce (AMS).4 In the third stage, a decision about the sanction is made by 
the unemployment insurance fund, and a motivation is provided. In 86%, the PES report 
results in approval of a sanction by the board; see IAF (2007). In a fourth stage, there may 
be an appeal to revert the decision. About 10% of all decisions are asked to be reverted, 
but in only about 20% of these is the decision partly or fully reversed. Subsequently, one 
may appeal against a sanction at the county administrative court (L¨ atten). ansr¨
There are several unpredictable events in this process. The case workers do not always 
observe that an unemployed has turned down a job offer.  Whether a report is written 
or not depends on the attitude of the case worker (Swedish overviews, like IAF, 2006, 
state that case workers report themselves that there are differences in interpretation of 
the regulations between counties and employment ofﬁces and between individual case 
2In addition to this, UI beneﬁts can be reduced if the individual has left employment without a valid reason 
or due to improper behavior at the work ﬂoor. UI is then suspended for a maximum of 45 days. We do not 
analyze this type of temporary beneﬁts reduction because our data do not allow for a distinction between 
causal effects and selection effects of treatments that start at the beginning of a spell. 
3In addition, eligibility is terminated if the individual sabotages cooperation with the employment ofﬁce, for 
example by refusing participate in an individualized “action plan” which is a pathway back to work with 
possibly active labor market program participation. In accordance with the deﬁnition of unemployment, we 
regard such eligibility losses as exits from the state of unemployment. 
4Nowadays, the inspection of the unemployment insurance (IAF) rather than AMS receives a copy. 
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depend on the board members attending the UI fund meeting. All this makes it unlikely 
that UI claimants anticipate the imposition of the sanction with great accuracy. 
Before the reform of February 5, 2001, the only available sanction was a 100% re­
duction of the beneﬁts level for a period of 10 to 60 days.  The choice of the length of 
the sanction period was supposed to take the (subjectively assessed) expected duration of 
the rejected employment into account. In practice, however, only a period of 60 days was 
used. 
As noted in Section 1, the Swedish monitoring system was (and is) notably different 
from the systems in many other countries (see Grubb, 2000, for details about the systems 
in other countries).  First, monitoring and job search assistance are carried out by the 
same case worker.  In other countries, monitoring is typically carried out by agencies 
that are distinct from the agencies providing job search assistance. Secondly, after inﬂow 
into UI, monitoring mainly restricts attention to job offer rejections. Other countries focus 
primarily on search effort, as captured by the number of applications sent out or indicators 
of the willingness to adhere to job search guidelines. 
Figure 1:  Monthly number of sanctions 1999-2004. 
Accordingly, Sweden is an outlier in aggregate statistics of sanctions. First, the num­
ber of sanctions issued is very low.  Figure 1 displays this number per month, between 
January 1999 and November 2004.  In 2000, about 3000 sanctions were issued, on an 
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of countries by sanction occurrence (which, roughly speaking, is deﬁned as number of 
sanctions divided by the number of unemployed), Sweden is the lowest among the nine 
European countries considered (Sweden 0.79, Germany 1.14, Belgium 4.2, Denmark 4.3, 
Finland 10.2, United Kingdom 10.3, Norway 10.8, Czech Republic 14.7, Switzerland 
40.3). Figures in other OECD countries are typically much higher than the Swedish ﬁg­
ure as well.  Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (2005) report that around 3% of the 
inﬂow of UI recipients receive a sanction during the UI spell, in The Netherlands in 1993. 
Contrary to Sweden, a number of these countries, including Germany, The Netherlands, 
and Denmark, has witnessed increases in the occurrence of sanctions since the early 2000s 
(see e.g. Svarer, 2007, and Schneider, 2008). We shall argue below that the low Swedish 
sanction occurrence can be explained by institutional differences in the monitoring sys­
tem. 
2.3  Policy change of the monitoring regime 
The uniquely low occurrence of sanctions in Sweden can be explained by a low effective 
level of monitoring.  In the late 1990s it was felt that the magnitude of the punishment 
(100% UI beneﬁts reductions for 60 days) was too large in the eyes of the case workers. 
After all, the case worker is primarily trying to help the unemployed individual, and the 
former would ﬁnd it morally difﬁcult to punish the latter harshly. This could prevent case 
workers from reporting violations. At the time, many other countries have policies where 
sanctions are smaller than 100% of the UI level.  Accordingly, the Swedish government 
changed the policy design on February 5, 2001 (see e.g. government prop. 1999/2000:139 
for the motivations behind the reform.) From then on, UI is reduced by 25% for 40 days 
for ﬁrst-time offenders, and by 50% for 40 days second-time offenders. A third violation 
during the same UI entitlement period entails a full loss of beneﬁts until new employment 
has been found.  The decision to change the monitoring policy was made on December 
21, 2000, which is 1.5 month before enforcement.  The public employment ofﬁce AMS 
arranged regional meetings to inform the case workers about the policy change.  These 
were held between the middle of February, 2001, and April, 2001.  Case workers com-
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clear to them (personal communications). 
Despite the policy change, the occurrence of sanctions has remained low by interna­
tional standards. In Subsection 4.3 we examine whether the occurrence of sanctions in our 
individual data registers displays differences before and after the implementation date. 
3  Theoretical insights 
3.1  A job search model with monitoring of job oﬀer decisions 
In this subsection we present a job search model with monitoring of job offer decisions. 
This model takes distinguishing features of the Swedish UI monitoring system into ac­
count and has not been analyzed in the literature.  It is a model of optimal behavior of 
unemployed individuals given the presence of a particular system in which sanctions can 
be imposed.  The model helps to understand the effects of such a system on individual 
behavior.  It also provides insights into the determinants of the rates at which jobs are 
found and sanctions are imposed and the relationships between these rates. 
Our point of departure is a basic job search model with a ﬁxed individual search 
intensity.  Consider an unemployed individual who searches sequentially for a job.  Job 
offers arrive according to the rate λ . Jobs are heterogeneous in their characteristics. For 
expositional convenience we take the wage as the only possible job characteristic in this 
subsection.  Offers are random drawings from a wage offer distribution F(w).  Every 
time an offer arrives the decision has to be made whether to accept it or to reject it and 
search further.  Once a job is accepted it will be held forever at the same wage.  During 
unemployment, a ﬂow of beneﬁts b is received, possibly including a non-pecuniary utility 
of being unemployed. The individual aims at maximization of the expected present value 
of income over an inﬁnite horizon. 
It is well known that in this model, under some regularity conditions, the optimal 
strategy of unemployed individuals can be characterized by a reservation wage φ, giving 
the minimal acceptable wage offer. The transition rate to work equals λ (1 − F(φ )). 
Now let us introduce monitoring in this model framework.  We assume that the case 
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rejected offers are deemed to be sufﬁciently suitable for the unemployed worker. Then a 
fraction pq of the rejected offers should not have been rejected. Accordingly, the sanction 
rate equals λ F(φ)pq. If p = 1 then all offers are monitored, and if p = q = 1 then each 
rejected offer entails a sanction. For a given p and q, we assume that the individual does 
not know which rejected offers are sampled or which are deemed acceptable by the case 
worker, but that he does know the values of p and q. 
Some individuals will be more willing to take the risk of being given a sanction than 
others, e.g. because they have a higher non-pecuniary utility of being unemployed. Obvi­
ously, if p = q = 1 and the punishment is sufﬁciently severe in comparison to a job with 
the lowest possible wage, then all job offers are always accepted, and sanctions would 
never be given. To proceed, we need to be speciﬁc about what occurs after the imposition 
of a sanction. First of all, beneﬁts (b) are reduced substantially. Secondly, p is likely to in­
crease. If the individual again violates the rules concerning job offer decisions, and this is 
observed by the case worker, then additional beneﬁts reductions are imposed. We assume 
that the punishment for additional violations is so severe that the individual will avoid this 
at all cost, so we assume that all offers are accepted after imposition of a sanction. This 
implies that sanctions are imposed at most once in a given spell of unemployment.  (A 
strategy in which individuals take a job upon imposition of a sanction, and quit immedi­
ately in order to make a “fresh start” in UI, would not be optimal: UI would be reduced 
again immediately after quitting because of “insufﬁcient effort to prevent job loss”; see 
Section 2.) 
For simplicity, we assume that the parameters b1  (being the beneﬁts level before a 
sanction is imposed), F,λ , p,q and the discount rate ρ are constant as a function of un­
employment duration. Upon imposition of a sanction, b is permanently reduced from b1 
to b2, with b2 constant as a function of unemployment duration. As a consequence, both 
within the time interval before a sanction and within the time interval after a sanction, the 
optimal strategy is constant over time. 
Let R1 and R2 denote the expected present value of income before and after imposition 
of a sanction, respectively, and let φ1 denote the reservation wage before the sanction. We 
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ρR1 = b1 + λ EF  max{
ρ 
, (1 − pq)R1 + pqR2}− R1  (1) 
w
ρR2 = b2 + λ EF  − R2  (2)
ρ 
with φ1 = (1 − pq)ρR1 + pqρR2 
Equation (1) can be understood by interpreting R1 as an asset for which the return ﬂow 
equals the ﬂow of what one expects to gain from holding the asset. The latter consists of 
two parts: (i) the ﬂow of beneﬁts, (ii) the job offer arrival rate times the expected gain of 
ﬁnding an acceptable job over staying unemployed. The second part is the mean over F 
of the gain corresponding to a wage offer w. If one accepts w then the associated present 
value is w/ρ, so the gain is w/ρ − R1. If one rejects it then there is a probability pq that 
one is caught, in which case the associated present value is R2, and a probability 1 − pq 
that one is not caught, with present value R1. The gain is again equal to the new present 
value minus R1.  The derivation of (2) is analogous.  Equations (1) and (2) can also be 
derived as Bellman equations from ﬁrst principles. 
Notice that with the strictest possible monitoring, i.e., p = q = 1, the outside option 
when considering an offer is equal to a certain punishment, so then φ1 = ρR2.  This 
implies that extreme monitoring does not necessarily entail the absence of punishments. 
With certain model parameter values, it may still be optimal for an individual to prefer 
a sanction and a forced future job offer acceptance over a current low offer.  This is 
particularly likely if the offer under consideration is much lower than the average offer, 
and if the punishment b2 − b1 is small. 
It is also interesting to consider the expected present value R �1 and optimal reservation 
wage φ �1 in the absence of a monitoring system, 
�  ∞  w
ρR �1 = b1 + λ  ( − R �1)dF(w),  with ρR �1 = φ �1  (3)
φ �1  ρ 
By elaborating on equations (1) and (2) we obtain the following expression for φ1, 
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φ1 = pqb2 +(1 − pq)b1 + (1 − pq) (w − φ1)dF(w)+ pq  (w − φ1)dF(w)
ρ φ  0 
which has a similar structure as the reservation wage equation in a standard job search 
model. Clearly, the latter is obtained by imposing p = q = 0. For general p,q, we obtain a 
weighted average of the reservation wage in a market without monitoring, and the present 
value ﬂow after having been punished. 
Using obvious notation, the transition rates from unemployment to employment be­
fore and after imposition of a sanction equal 
θu,1 = λ (1 − F(φ1))  and  θu,2 = λ  (4) 
For a system with given p and q, the probability that a sanction occurs before a job 
exit is equal to λ pqF(φ1)/(λ pqF(φ1)+ λ (1 − F(φ1))) = pqF(φ1)/(1 − (1 − pq)F(φ1)). 
This can be seen by noting that a newly unemployed individual faces competing risks 
(a sanction and job exit) with constant rates λ pqF(φ1) and θu,1, respectively.  The pro­
portionate effect of the sanction on the job exit rate equals θu,2/θu,1 = 1/(1 − F(φ1)). 
This correspond to a parameter of the empirical model.  The additive effect of a sanc­
tion on the mean accepted wage equals EF (w) − EF (w|w > φ1).  The empirical model 
contains a parameter that captures the additive effect on the mean log accepted wage 
EF (logw) − EF (logw|w > φ1).  Of course the empirical parameters are not constrained 
to have a particular sign, and they may themselves depend on deeper determinants and 
characteristics of the individual and the labor market. 
The additive effect on the job exit rate equals θu,2 − θu,1 = λ F(φ1). Notice that this is 
bounded from above by λ . 
3.2  Theoretical predictions 
A number of insights follow from the model. Consider the general case where the model 
parameters are such that φ1 > w: the reservation wage before a sanction is imposed ex­
ceeds the lowest possible wage offer in the market.  This is a necessary condition to 
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the point of view of the individual, monitoring reduces the expected present value, and so 
does an actual punishment in a world with monitoring.  By implication, θu,1 < θu,2, and 
both are larger than the transition rate in a world without monitoring. 
Consequently, monitoring affects the transition rate of all individuals (except for those 
who have a very low reservation wage φ �1  anyway).  This is the ex ante effect of the 
monitoring system, as opposed to the ex post effect due to imposition of a sanction. 
Notice that if φ1 ≤ w then the individual probability of job acceptance is equal to 
one, so there will not be any sanctions.  If the case worker is very lenient (q = 0) then 
the sanction rate is zero as well.  Conversely, we have seen that in the strictest possible 
monitoring system (p = q = 1), an individual may still prefer to reject a low-wage offer in 
favor of a sanction. This reﬂects a ﬁrst fundamental difference with monitoring schemes 
that target an endogenously chosen level of search effort by the individual (see Abbring, 
Van den Berg and Van Ours, 2005, for a theoretical analysis). In the latter scheme, perfect 
monitoring leads to absence of sanctions, even if the punitive beneﬁts reduction is small. 
This is because perfect search effort monitoring is instantaneous and continuous in time 
and the effort constraint will be strictly enforced after a violation. Perfect monitoring of 
offers only takes place after offer rejections, and a rejection followed by a sanction may 
be worthwhile if it is followed by a high wage offer at a later point in time. 
It is interesting to consider the ex post effect and the occurrence of sanctions for 
different subgroups of individuals.  First, consider individuals for whom F(φ) is very 
small. Since φ1 := (1 − pq)ρR1 + pqρR2, it follows that their expected present value of 
unemployment after rejection of an offer is low.  At the same time, they are unlikely to 
reject an offer and therefore unlikely to get a sanction. These may be individuals with a 
low R1 due to a low job offer arrival rate λ and low beneﬁts b1. Their sanction effect is 
small as well.  Notice that for moderate values of F(φ1), the probability pqF(φ1)/(1 − 
(1 − pq)F(φ1)) that a sanction occurs before a job exit can still be extremely small if q is 
very small. In that case the sanction effect is not necessarily extremely small. 
Secondly, consider the opposite case where F(φ ) is large (i.e., close to one).  This 
may capture long-term unemployed individuals who enjoy generous beneﬁts b1 whereas 
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skill jobs with wages below b1  (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1997, for an equilibrium 
analysis). Such individuals have a very high sanction rate and sanction effect. But now let 
us consider what happens if individuals can optimally choose their search effort s as well. 
Let the job offer arrival rate now be speciﬁed as λ s, and let the search cost ﬂow c(s) be 
a convex increasing function of s with c(0) = c�(0) = 0, so that the instantaneous income 
ﬂow before a sanction equals b1 − c(s). The optimal value of s before a sanction follows 
from maximization of the right-hand side of the suitably adjusted equation (1), leading to 
�  ∞ λ 
c�(s) = max{0,  (w − φ1)dF(w) − λ pq(R1 − R2)}
ρ φ 
If φ1 is at the upper bound of the support of F, then the integral in the above expression 
vanishes, implying that s = 0. The same result holds for values of φ1 close to the upper 
bound.  If the monitoring regime is stringent then the last term on the right-hand side 
increases, so the reduction of optimal search effort is exacerbated.  In sum, when these 
individuals can choose their level of search effort, then offer decision monitoring will be 
counteracted by a reduction of search effort.  To put it bluntly, monitoring of offer deci­
sions causes individuals with high beneﬁts (or a high utility ﬂow of being unemployed) 
to prevent that they will ever get an offer. The ex ante effect of monitoring may then be 
perverse:  more monitoring implies a lower job exit rate.  We view this as a potentially 
important insight.  Whereas job search effort monitoring always generates a positive ex 
ante effect, job offer decision monitoring does not. 
We brieﬂy mention two other differences between job search effort monitoring and 
job offer decision monitoring. These concern outcomes after the sanction. Recall that we 
assume perfect monitoring after the sanction.  The ﬁrst of the two differences concerns 
the magnitude of the ex post effect on the job exit rate.  Suppose that search effort s is 
endogenously determined. In the case of job offer decision monitoring, the job exit rate 
after a sanction equals θu,2 = λ s2, where s2 is the optimal search effort after a sanction. 
Conversely, in the case of search effort monitoring, this rate equals λ s  ∗(1−F(φ2)), where 
φ2 is the optimal reservation wage after a sanction and s  ∗ is the minimum required search 
IFAU – Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality  17 effort as postulated by the UI agency. In the latter case, by choosing an appropriately high 
s  ∗, the job exit rate, and by implication the ex post sanction effect, can be pushed upwards 
to arbitrarily high values. In the former case this is not possible. Intuitively, the effect of 
job offer monitoring is bounded from above by the rate at which job offers arrive.  (Of 
course, by pushing up s∗∗ in search effort monitoring, the privately incurred search costs 
c(s) increase at an even higher speed. Also, if s  ∗ becomes very large then the distribution 
of the associated wage offers may change at the margin.) 
The fourth and ﬁnal difference between the monitoring regimes was already men-
tioned in the introduction of the paper, namely that the adverse effects of sanctions on 
post-unemployment outcomes may be smaller with search effort monitoring than with 
job offer decision monitoring. Perfect monitoring after a sanction implies full compliance 
after the sanction.  With job offer decision monitoring, this means that compared to the 
situation before a sanction, punished individuals now also have to accept all offers of jobs 
with the lowest wages.  With search effort monitoring, however, full compliance means 
that punished individuals have to search harder for any possible job. The latter includes 
both high-wage jobs and low-wage jobs. 
All results in this section generalize to non-wage job characteristics. Basically, if the 
individual’s utility ﬂow function depends on the wage and on other characteristics then the 
role of the income ﬂow variables in the present section is replaced by the corresponding 
utility ﬂows. 
We ﬁnish this section by brieﬂy mentioning some implications of the above that are of 
importance for the speciﬁcation of the empirical model. The empirical model is a reduced­
form model in which hazard rates are allowed to vary over time and across observed and 
unobserved individual characteristics.  The implications below also follow from models 
with monitoring of an endogenously determined search effort (see Abbring, Van den Berg 
and Van Ours, 2005). First, at the individual level, the transition rate from unemployment 
to employment makes a discrete upward jump upon imposition of a sanction. If individu­
als are homogeneous then the size of this jump, which is the causal effect of the sanction 
treatment, can be estimated from an unemployment duration model in which the moment 
at which a sanction occurs is a time-varying exogenous covariate. 
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not allow for non-parametric identiﬁcation of ex ante effects.  So such analyses cannot 
be used to evaluate the effect of the monitoring system on unemployment durations. The 
latter objective requires at least some observed variation in the monitoring system itself. 
Both the transition rate from unemployment to employment and the rate at which a 
sanction arrives depend on all the variables that the individual uses to determine his strat­
egy. This is because both depend on φ1 (provided that φ1 > w). In reality, individuals are 
heterogeneous with respect to determinants of search behavior. Suppose that the individ­
uals know their own value of some characteristic but that these values are not observed in 
the data. As we argued in Section 1, with punitive treatments, such a setting is plausible. 
Then both the transition rate from unemployment to employment and the rate at which 
a sanction is imposed depend on this unobserved characteristic.  This creates a spurious 
relation between the duration until a sanction is imposed and the duration of unemploy­
ment.  Note that a similar spurious relation is created if the policy parameters p and q 
of the sanction rate itself differ across individuals in a way that is not observed by the 
researcher. 
4  Data 
4.1  Data registers 
Our main data are taken from a combination of two Swedish register data sets called 
H¨ andel (from the ofﬁcial employment ofﬁces) and ASTAT (from the unemployment in­
surance fund). H¨ andel covers all registered unemployed persons.5 It contains day-by-day 
information on the unemployment status, whether the unemployed is covered by UI, en­
tries into and exits from active labor market programs and part-time unemployment, and 
the reason for the unemployment spell to end.  As a rule, UI spells end in transitions 
into re-employment, education, social assistance, or other insurance schemes.  H¨ andel 
also includes a number of background characteristics, recorded at the beginning of the 
unemployment spell.  ASTAT provides information on all beneﬁts sanctions, including 
5According to Carling,  Holmlund and Vejsiu (2001),  more than 90% of the individuals who are ILO­
unemployed according to labor force surveys also register at the employment ofﬁces. 
IFAU – Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality  19 information on the timing of the sanction, the main reason for the sanction, and the size 
of the beneﬁt reduction. 
Our observation window runs from January 1, 1999 until December 31, 2003.  We 
only use information on individuals who become unemployed at least once within the 
observation window. An individual becomes unemployed at the ﬁrst date at which he reg­
isters at the employment ofﬁce as being ”openly” unemployed. We ignore unemployment 
spells that are already in progress at the beginning of the observation window, because 
using them would force us to make assumptions about the period before the beginning of 
the window. We focus on re-employment durations, and consider any employment, full­
time or part-time, which is retained for at least 10 days as employment. At later stages we 
separately model the decision to accept part-time employment.  UI spells that terminate 
for other reasons than re-employment are considered being right-censored re-employment 
durations. We stop time while unemployed are enrolled into active labor market programs. 
Robustness analysis shows that our results are insensitive to this restriction. Apart from 
that, individuals are only followed up to December 2004. Ongoing spells at that date are 
right-censored. We restrict our analysis to everyone who was between 25-55 at the time 
of entry into unemployment and covered by UI.6 We only model the ﬁrst sanction during 
an unemployment spell.  Any effects of a second or third sanction are considered to be 
a part of the ﬁrst sanction treatment effect. Finally, we exclude all unemployment spells 
for a speciﬁc individual that occur after a spell during which a sanction was given to that 
individual. This is because we exploit multiple spells to enhance the quality of the results, 
and we cannot rule out that a sanction also affects future subsequent spells. 
The sanction and unemployment data are combined with survey data on wages and 
hours worked from Statistics Sweden’s wage statistics.  It provides us with information 
on actual wages per time unit, so these are not wages created from annual earnings and 
some measurement of hours worked.  The wage is recorded as the monthly full-time 
equivalent wage. The survey is collected annually (during the fall) by Statistics Sweden 
in cooperation with employer organizations.  It covers the whole public sector, all large 
6We also exclude disabled individuals and everyone who some time during the research period participated in 
sheltered employment, because these are intended for unemployed with some kind of disability or handicap. 
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employees).  If we observe a wage within one year after the exit to employment we use 
this wage, otherwise the wage is considered to be missing.  The information on hours 
worked is used to construct an indicator variable for full-time employment, deﬁned as 
working 34 hours or more a week. 
The wage data also include individual occupations. These are classiﬁed using SSYK 
96 (Standard f¨ or svensk yrkesklassiﬁcering 1996), which follows the international stan­
dard ISCO-88.  Each occupation is classiﬁed into 355 separate groups of occupations 
(four digits).  The ﬁrst digit classiﬁes occupations by the general qualiﬁcations required 
to perform the tasks associated with each occupation.  It divides the occupations into 
four levels:  the occupations in group 1 normally require no or limited education, level 
2 occupations require high school competence, level 3 occupations short university ed­
ucation, and the occupations at level 4 require longer university education (3-4 years or 
more). Additional digits capture the specialization skills associated with each occupation. 
We matched occupations to individual education levels taken from Statistics Sweden’s 
database “Louise”. 
4.2  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides statistics on the unemployment spells and the duration until a sanction. In 
Subsection 5.4 below we explain that we choose to estimate models with an endogenously 
stratiﬁed sample. The current subsection provides information on the full data set and on 
the sample used for the model estimation.  A large part, 65.7%, of the re-employment 
spells in our analysis data set is not right-censored. Remember that the remaining 34.3% 
of the spells are ongoing at the end of the data period, or UI spells that are completed for 
other reasons than re-employment. During only 0.18% of the unemployment spells in our 
full sample a sanction is imposed, compared with 8.4% in the data set used for the model 
estimation.  Relatively many sanctions, 46.7%, are imposed during the ﬁrst 100 days of 
unemployment. There is also a substantial number of sanctions, 16%, imposed after 300 
days or more in unemployment.  Because of censoring, these raw ﬁgures underestimate 
the incidence of sanctions and the duration at which these are imposed. About 8% of the 
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Table 1:  Sample statistics for duration in unemployment and duration until a sanction 
Full sample  Our sample 
Regardless of treatment 
No. individuals  827,074  16,941 
No. spells  1,665,420  35,055 
% with exactly one spell  48.7  49.4 
% with exactly two spells  24.2  24.0 
% with more than two spells  7.1  7.0 
% ts observed  0.18  8.4 
% te observed  65.7  65.2 
average observed te  104.4 (112.4)  114.5 (122.9) 
median observed te  68  74 
Concerning spells with sanction observed 
No. Spells  2941  2941 
% te observed  56.1  56.1 
average observed ts  240.2 (174.0)  240.2 (174.0) 
median observed ts  193  193 
average observed te  140.6 (134.0)  140.6 (134.0) 
median observed te  96  96 
% ts in 
0-50 days  27.1  27.1 
50-100 days  19.7  19.7 
100-150 days  12.3  12.3 
150-200 days  10.6  10.6 
200-250 days  7.5  7.5 
250-300 days  6.1  6.1 
300- days  16.6  16.6 
Type of sanctions 
% 100% reduction for 60 days  68.0  68.0 
% 25% reduction in 40 days  32.0  32.0 
Notes: The time unit is day. ts is time until sanction, and te time in unemployment.  Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Full sample is the full sample of all unemployment spells, and our sample the selected sample described in the data 
section. 
Table 2 provides statistics on the job-quality measures.  For about 35% of the spells 
for which observe an exit to employment we observe the wage within one year after the 
exit. Not observing the wage can be due to fact that the individual is employed in small 
private ﬁrms or due to fact that the individual already left employment before the time 
of the survey.  As the wage survey is conducted annually, the mean time from the exit 
to employment to the time of the wage survey is about half a year (179 days).  Note 
that, because the survey is mainly conducted during the fall and because there is seasonal 
variation in exits from unemployment, the time from the exit to the survey is not uniformly 
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individuals for whom we observe the wage, and about 57% of these individuals have full­
time employment. Furthermore, 57% ﬁnd a job in the public sector, 31% in a large private 
ﬁrm, and 21% ﬁnd a job in a small private ﬁrm.  Here, a large ﬁrm is deﬁned as having 
200 employees or more. 
The missing wage data may not be missing at random.  First of all, remember that 
we observe the wage for all public sector employees, all employees at large private ﬁrms, 
and a random sample of those working in small ﬁrms. Suppose that individuals who are 
sanctioned accept lower wages on average.  Small ﬁrms tend to pay lower wages than 
large ﬁrms, so there may be a selectivity in the wage observations, and this may lead to 
an under-estimation in absolute values of the negative effect of sanctions on wages.  To 
explore this, we specify a logit model for the choice between accepting public sector or 
private sector employment, and, given the choice to enter the private sector, a logit model 
for the choice between accepting employment in a large ﬁrm or a small.  In both mod­
els we control for a number of covariates, such as sex, age, level of education, time of 
inﬂow into unemployment, regional variables, level of education, the kind of profession 
the unemployed is searching for and whether the unemployed has education respectively 
previous experience in that occupation. We estimate these two logit models jointly using 
maximum likelihood, and the results are presented in Table 3.  The results show no evi­
dence of selection due to a sanction into small private ﬁrms. We therefore feel conﬁdent 
in assuming that it is random whether we observe the wage or not.  The same holds for 
hours worked. 
The second concern regards the fact that, in most cases, some time elapses between 
the exit from unemployment and the wage survey. It means that we do not observe the ﬁrst 
wage after unemployment for individuals who have quickly moved into a second or even 
third employment. We neither observe the wage for those who have become unemployed 
or left the labor market entirely before the wage survey is conducted. Both these factors 
may bias our job quality estimates. If there is an effect of a sanction on the job security, 
relatively more individuals with sanctions will go back into unemployment before the 
time of the wage survey.  As these individuals can be expected to be on the lower end 
IFAU – Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality  23 Table 2:  Sample statistics for wages and hours worked 
Full sample  Our sample 
Wage data 
% exit to employment observed  65.7  65.2 
Of which 
Observe wage %  36.5  35.1 
Observe hours worked %  30.4  29.2 
Public sector employment %  55.9  57.2 
Private sector ﬁrm ≥ 200 workers  31.2  30.4 
Private sector ﬁrm < 200 workers  21.7  21.0 
Monthly wage in SEK  17941 (4371)  17843 (4446) 
Full time (≥ 34 hours a week) %  58.7  57.0 
Average time between exit and wage survey  179.5 (107.6)  178.9 (108.3) 
Median time between exit and wage survey  161  161 
Time between exit and wage survey 
-60 days  13.7  14.5 
61-120 days  22.3  21.8 
121-180 days  18.7  19.0 
181-240 days  13.7  13.4 
241-300 days  14.6  14.0 
301- days  17.0  17.4 
Individual 
Male (%)  50.2  52.2 
Education in occupation (%)  64.6  65.5 
Experience in occupation (%)  39.6  39.7 
Needs Guidance (%)  22.8  23.2 
Age  36.4 (8.14)  36.4(8.11) 
North (%)  22.1  22.3 
Central (%)  37.5  36.9 
South (%)  40.4  40.8 
Less than high school (%)  20.3  21.3 
High school education (%)  54.3  55.3 
University education (%)  25.4  23.4 
Local unemployment (%)  5.15(1.53)  5.14 (1.54) 
Time of inﬂow 
1999  21.9  21.9 
2000  20.0  20.4 
2001  19.0  19.6 
2002  19.4  19.6 
2003  19.7  18.5 
Notes:  Wage is the ﬁrst observed (within one year) after the exit from unemployment.  Time of inﬂow is deﬁned as the 
calendar year the unemployment spell starts.  Full sample is the full sample of all unemployment spells, and our sample 
the selected sample described in the data section.  Standard deviations in parentheses. 
of the wage distribution it will also bias our job quality estimates upwards.  In addition, 
if unemployed with sanctions move relatively faster into a second employment, with a 
higher wage, it will also bias our job quality estimates upwards. To proceed ahead, even 
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between large and small private ﬁrm 
Public sector 
Est.  S.e.. 
Large private ﬁrm 
Est.  S.e. 
Sanction eﬀect  0.038  0.107  0.067  0.151 
Individual 
Male 
Education in occupation 
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Notes:  Public sector deﬁned as an indicator variable taking the value one if the unemployed ﬁnds employment in the 
public sector.  Large private ﬁrm deﬁned as an indicator variable taking the value of if unemployed ﬁnds employment 
in a ﬁrm with more than 200 employees, given that the unemployed have found private sector employment.  Sample 
consist of everyone in our analysis sample for which we observe exit to employment and have information on the type 
employment within one year after the exit.  Estimated using WESML. 
with these potential biases we ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative job quality effects. 
4.3  Around the date of the monitoring policy regime change 
In this subsection we provide descriptive statistics on the occurrence of sanctions shortly 
before and after the policy change of February 5, 2001. Ideally, a change in the monitoring 
regime offers an opportunity to investigate the ex ante threat effect. 
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number of sanctions issued.  Instead, apart from seasonal ﬂuctuations, this number has 
been increasing slowly and steadily after the reform. 
Figure 2:  Index over quarterly number of sanctions 2000-2004 for three regions in southern Sweden. 
1999 is base year. 
Figure 3:  Index over quarterly number of sanctions 2000-2004 for three regions in the central parts of 
Sweden. 1999 is base year. 
In addition, there are large regional differences in the development of the number of 
sanctions over time.  Regional variation is to some extent due to the fact that only the 
individual case worker and the chief of the local PES ofﬁce decide about whether a report 
should be sent to the unemployment insurance fund (recall the statements in IAF, 2006 
mentioned in Subsection 2.2). Table 4 lists the mean number of sanctions per quarter by 
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for each of the years 2000-2004 using the quarters of 1999 as base period.  An index 
value of 2 in 2003 means that sanctions are twice as frequent in 2003 as in the same 
quarter in 1999.  We display this for three regions in the southern and the central parts 
of Sweden, respectively.  They reveal a wide regional variation in patterns after 2000. 
We observe permanently increased sanction numbers in some regions, no change in some 
other regions, and temporary increases in sanctions in yet other regions.  To focus more 
closely on the moment of the policy change, we list in Table 4 the ratio between sanction 
occurrences in the ﬁrst quarter of 2001 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2000, and the same for the 
other quarters in 2001 and 2000.  These ratios are purged from seasonal variation.  The 
statistics conﬁrm the patterns in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
Clearly, from a methodological point of view, it is hard to reconcile the erratic and 
region-speciﬁc ﬂuctuations in the occurrence of sanctions after the policy change to the 
idea of exploiting the discontinuity in the monitoring system for the estimation of ex ante 
Table 4:  Summary statistics for regional occurrence of sanctions. 
NS 2001 / NS 2000 
1000NS/NU  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
Stockholm  1.46  1.12  1.32  1.18  1.19 
Uppsala  0.68  1.00  1.00  0.88  0.69 
S¨ odermanland  0.99  5.60  0.95  0.72  0.21 
¨  Osterg¨ otland  0.75  0.44  0.64  1.69  0.81 
J¨ onk¨ oping  1.10  1.21  1.35  1.74  0.70 
Kronoberg  1.12  1.83  1.90  0.63  0.67 
Kalmar  1.64  2.40  2.38  1.17  1.69 
Blekinge  0.79  0.79  2.89  6.33  3.75 
Sk˚ ane  1.12  1.14  1.38  1.39  1.81 
Halland  0.67  1.33  0.81  0.90  0.74 
V¨ astra G¨ otaland  0.82  0.95  0.86  0.75  0.96 
V¨ armland  1.21  1.45  1.41  1.14  0.76 
¨  Orebro  1.35  0.41  1.04  1.05  2.23 
V¨ astmanland  0.78  1.45  2.11  1.00  0.56 
Dalarna  0.72  0.73  1.33  0.52  1.13 
G¨ avleborg  0.69  0.57  0.69  1.05  0.72 
V¨ asternorrland  0.89  1.33  1.75  1.13  1.56 
J¨ amtland  0.97  1.64  1.00  0.40  0.23 
V¨ asterbotten  1.16  1.42  0.57  0.83  0.86 
Norrbotten  1.07  1.67  1.11  1.11  2.10 
Notes:  NS is the mean number of sanctions in the region, and NU is the mean stock of full-time unemployed collecting 
unemployment insurance beneﬁts in the region.  Qi  stands for the i’th quarter. 
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increased substantially after the policy change. According to our theoretical model, there 
are two possible explanations for this. First, the case workers have decided to not to act 
on policy change but instead to continue not to recommend sanctions in case of viola­
tions, because they ﬁnd a 25% beneﬁts reduction still too severe. Obviously, in the new 
system, the punishments are less harsh than before, but from an international perspective 
they are still substantial.  In the Netherlands, where sanctions are less severe, and mon­
itoring is carried out by different individuals than the case workers, the individuals who 
carry out the monitoring state that they are less likely to issue a sanction if they feel that 
the unemployed individual faces adverse labor market conditions (see Van den Berg and 
Van der Klaauw, 2006). In agreement to this, studies with Dutch data ﬁnd that individual 
characteristics that are associated with a low exit rate to work are also associated with 
a low sanction rate, conﬁrming that the monitoring intensity depends positively on the 
individual’s labor market conditions.  In terms of our theoretical model, this ﬁrst expla­
nation would mean that the policy change does not lead to any substantial changes in the 
parameters in the decision problem for the unemployed individual. 
The second explanation for the low occurrence of sanctions after the policy change 
is that a more stringent monitoring scheme may motivate many individuals to avoid vi­
olations at all costs, i.e.  that the policy change induced a strong ex ante effect.  The net 
effect of an increase in the monitoring and a decrease in violations may then be that the 
occurrence of sanctions remains low. In terms of our theoretical model, the policy change 
is captured by an increase of q which leads to a decrease of φ1 such that virtually all of­
fers are accepted.  In Subsection 3.2 we also showed that an increase of q may lead to 
a reduction of search effort to zero, such that no offers are generated in the ﬁrst place, 
and consequently sanctions do not occur. However, this is potentially only relevant for a 
subset of individuals. Obviously, a zero effort gives rise to extremely long unemployment 
spells. 
A third explanation is that monitoring was virtually perfect in both regimes, but this 
seems borne out by the motivation for the policy change as well as by the variation in 
enforcement across case workers. 
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duration outcomes and the post-unemployment outcomes.  The ﬁrst explanation implies 
that the job exit rate θu,1 is the same in both regimes.  The second explanation implies 
that this rate changes after the policy change.  This is because in the ﬁrst case φ1 does 
not change whereas in the second case it decreases.  The identiﬁcation of a subgroup 
of individuals with zero search effort in the new regime seems to be beyond what is 
empirically feasible, but we should keep in mind that such a subgroup may exist.  We 
return to the issues of this subsection after having presented the duration model estimates 
in Section 6. 
5  Empirical model 
5.1  Timing of Events model 
This section presents our empirical model. In Subsection 5.1, we present a basic bivariate 
duration model, for the duration until employment and the duration until the imposition 
of a sanction. This “timing of events” approach (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003) is the 
standard approach in the literature on sanction effects. In Subsection 5.2 we extend this 
well known model into our full model, incorporating the job quality into the same model. 
We normalize the point of time at which the individual enters unemployment to zero. 
We are interested in investigating how the duration ts until the imposition of a sanction 
affect the duration until employment, te. In order to illustrate the basic identiﬁcation prob­
lem, suppose that we observe that the individuals who are sanctioned at ts have relatively 
short unemployment durations then this can be for two reasons: (1) the individual causal 
sanction effect is positive, or (2) these individuals have relatively favorable unobserved 
characteristics and would have found a job relatively fast anyway.  The second relation 
is a spurious selection effect.  To control for such spurious effects, we analyze both the 
distribution of te for a given ts and the distribution of ts jointly. It is well known that these 
distributions can be conveniently represented by the corresponding hazard rates. 
First, consider individuals who are unemployed for t units of time.  We assume that 
all individual differences in the re-employment rate at t can be characterized by observed 
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been imposed before t.  Next, consider the rate at which a sanction is imposed on an 
unemployed individual.  Similarly as for the re-employment hazard, we assume that all 
individual differences in this rate can be characterized by observed characteristics x and 
unobserved characteristics Vs.  We further assume that the re-employment rate denoted 
by θe(t|x,Ve,ts), and the sanction rate denoted by θs(t|x,Vs) both have the familiar Mixed 
Proportional Hazard (MPH) speciﬁcation, this gives 
θe(t|x,Ve,ts) = λe(t) exp(x�βe) exp(I(t > ts)δ (t|ts,x)) Ve,  (5) 
θs(t|x,Vs) = λs(t) exp(x�βs) Vs.  (6) 
Here I(.) is an indicator function taking the value one if the argument is true and zero 
otherwise. δ (t|ts,x) then represent the sanction effect, which we allow to vary both with 
observed characteristics and with time, t − ts, since the imposition of a sanction. Further, 
λe(t) and λs(t) represents the duration dependence in the re-employment hazard and the 
sanction hazard, respectively. 
Equation (5) and (6) give the joint distribution of te,ts|x,Ve,Vs.  Our data provide in­
formation on the distribution of te,ts|x.  Let G denote the joint distribution of Ve,Vs|x in 
the inﬂow into unemployment.  It is clear that a speciﬁcation of G, together with the 
speciﬁcation of the joint distribution of te,ts|x,Ve,Vs, fully determines the distribution of 
te,ts|x, and thus the data. Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) show that all components of 
this model, including δ , are identiﬁed, provided we make assumptions similar to those 
usually made in standard univariate MPH models with exogenous regressors. Identiﬁca­
tion is semi-parametric in the sense that given the MPH structure it does not require any 
parametric assumptions on the components of the model. In fact, with a non-parametric 
speciﬁcation of G, we allow for general dependence between te and ts through both the 
causal effect of sanctions and related unobservables. 
Note that this identiﬁcation does not rely on conditional independence assumptions. 
The identiﬁcation does not either rely on any exclusion restrictions on the effects of x 
on the speciﬁcations of θe and θs.  This is important, since from theory we have that all 
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Instead, identiﬁcation is based on the timing of events, i.e.  the timing of sanctions and 
of exits out of unemployment.  Intuitively, what drives the identiﬁcation of the sanction 
effect, δ , is the extent to which the moments of a sanction and the moment of exit to 
employment are close in time.  If a sanction is quickly followed by exit to employment, 
no matter how long the elapsed unemployment duration before the sanction, then this is 
evidence of a causal effect of a sanction.  Any spurious selection effects through depen­
dence between Vs and Ve, gives a second relation between the two duration variables, but 
it can be shown that that relation does not give rise to the same type of quick succession 
of events.  So the interaction between the moment of exit and the moment of a sanction 
in the conditional rate of events allows one to distinguish between the causal effect and 
selectivity.  The Monte Carlo simulations in Gaure, Røed and Zhang (2007) support the 
use of this approach by showing that the estimates of the parameters of interest are robust 
with respect to functional form assumptions. 
Formally, identiﬁcation of the model relies on a number of implicit and explicit as­
sumptions. We assume that a sanction does not affect the re-employment rate before the 
moment of the sanction, whereas the effects of the unobserved covariates are ﬁxed during 
the spell.  The former is often referred to as the no-anticipation assumption.  With sanc­
tions, the moment at which an individual is caught is almost by deﬁnition unanticipated by 
the individual. As explained in Section 2 there are also several sources of unpredictability 
in the sanction process, which makes it even less likely that UI claimants anticipate the 
actual timing of the sanction. Next, since we speciﬁed the hazard rate it means that we im­
plicitly assumed that there is a random component in the assignments that is independent 
of all other variables. Based on the randomness in the sanction process and the obvious 
randomness in the job-search process, we are conﬁdent that this assumption is satisﬁed. 
Identiﬁcation with single-spell data also requires that (i) x on the one hand and Vu, 
Vs on the other hand are independent in the inﬂow, and (ii) there is sufﬁcient variation 
in x.  However, since we often observe multiple UI spells for a given individual we can 
relax these two assumptions.  We assume that multiple spells for one individual given 
the characteristics are statistically independent of each other, that the unobservables Vu 
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unemployment spells of a single individual are independent of Vu and Vs.  As shown by 
Abbring and Van den Berg (2003), under these assumptions, the assumptions (i) and (ii) 
can be discarded. 
5.2  Extension to post-unemployment outcomes 
We measure job quality by the monthly wage, and by whether the accepted job is full-time 
or part-time.  These outcomes can be expected to depend on unobserved factors that are 
related to the unobserved determinants of the job exit rate and the sanction hazard.  For 
instance, ability plays an important role for all these outcomes.  In order to identify the 
effects of a sanction on the job quality we need to impose some structure. We assume that 
the causal effect and the selection effect only affect the mean log wage, and we assume 
that these effects are additive. Speciﬁcally, the wage at the start of the new employment 
can be expressed as 
ln w = x�βw + γwI(ts < te)+Vw + ew,  (7) 
where γw is the sanction effect, Vw unobserved individual characteristics, and ew is an error 
term which reﬂects random variation in the hourly wage.  ew is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. Similarly, we specify the decision to accept  w
full-time employment as 
h = 1[x�βh + γhI(ts < te)+Vh + eh > 0]  (8) 
where h = 1 if the individual ﬁnds full-time employment.  As before γh is the sanction 
effect, Vh unobserved individual characteristics, and eh an error term which reﬂects truly 
random variation. eh is assumed to have a standard logistic distribution. 
We also acknowledge the tight link between the unobserved effects in the two job 
quality measures and the unobserved effects in the sanction hazard and the exit hazard. 
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We take a simple linear form for this relation, as 
Vw = βweVe + βwsVs,  (9) 
and 
Vu = βheVe + βhsVs.  (10) 
Here βwe,βws, βhe, and βhs  captures the correlation between the unobservables in the 
model. 
Abstracting from censoring, the joint density of Te,Ts,W,H|x at Te = te,Ts = ts,W = 
w,H = 1 is then 
�  ∞ �  ∞ 
(λe(te)exp(x�βe)ve exp(I(te > ts)δ (te|ts,x))
 
0 0
  ��  min(te,ts)  �  te 
exp  − exp(x�βe)ve  λe(k)dk + I(te > ts)  λe(k)δ (k|ts,x)dk 
0  � �  ts 
ts  � 




(lnw − x�βw − γwI(te > ts) − βweve − βwsvs)2 � 
√  exp  − ×
2σ2 σ  2π 
exp(x�βh + γhI(te > ts)+ βheve + βhsvs) 
G(ve,vs)  (11)
1 + exp(x�βh + γhI(te > ts)+ βheve + βhsvs)
We jointly estimate this full model. 
Consider identiﬁcation of this full model. In short the duration part of the model iden­
tiﬁes G, and given this we can estimate βwe,βws, βhe, and βhs. We have then uncovered the 
selection process in the job quality decisions. It allows us to integrate out the unobserved 
effects in the wage equation and the hours worked equation. 
5.3  Parameterizations 
Given the assumptions discussed above, including the MPH structure, the model is iden­
tiﬁed without any further parametric restrictions.  However from a computational point 
of view we need to specify some parametric structure.  We take ﬂexible speciﬁcations 
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distribution. We take both λe(t) and λs(t) to have a series representation 
λi(t) =  ∑  αijt j.  (12) 
j=0,1,... 
Note that with a large number of polynomials any duration dependence pattern can be 
approximated closely.  In the basic analysis we take polynomials of seventh order and 
lower for the exit hazard, and polynomials of third order and lower for the exit hazard. 
We have experimented with both more and less polynomials. The results are insensitive 
such changes, unless the number of polynomials are very few. 
We use a bivariate discrete distribution with unrestricted mass point locations for G. 
This provides a very ﬂexible speciﬁcation as well as being computationally feasible.  In 
our basic speciﬁcation we take Ve and Vs to have two points of support each: V 1, V 2 and 
V 3 and V 4, respectively. The associated probabilities are denoted as follows: 
Pr(Ve = V 1 ,Vs = V 3) = p1,  Pr(Ve = V 2 ,Vs = V 3) = p2 
(13) 
Pr(Ve = V 2 ,Vs = V 3) = p3  and  Pr(Ve = V 2 ,Vs = V 3) = p4, 
with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for i = 1,..,4, and p4 = 1 − p1 − p2 − p3. 
5.4  Weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood estimation 
Our full data set contains over 1.6 million unemployment spells of about 827,000 indi­
viduals.  In only about 3000 of these spells a sanction is imposed.  To keep the empiri­
cal analysis manageable from a computational point of view and at the same time have 
enough spell with sanctions, we use weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood 
(WESML) estimation with an endogenously stratiﬁed sample. This method has not been 
used yet in the context of bivariate dependent-duration models, and is not widely used 
in labor economics in general (see Ridder and Mofﬁtt, 2007, for a detailed econometric 
overview). 
With exogenous sampling, a sequence of individuals is sampled and their outcomes 
and characteristics are recorded.  In contrast, with endogenous sampling, a sequence of 
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outcomes are sampled and the characteristics of the individuals with these outcomes are 
recorded. Endogenous stratiﬁed sampling has, for instance, previously been used in trans­
portation economics (see e.g.  Manski and Lerman, 1979, and Garrow and Koppelman, 
2004) and biostatistics.  A key example is the study of rare diseases, for which it is rea­
sonable to over-sample individuals with rare disease. 
In our case we wish to use all information on the individuals who receive a sanction. 
We therefore sample all individuals who experience at least one sanction in the obser­
vation window, and take a smaller random sample (14,000) of individuals who do not 
experience a sanction during this window.  For these individuals, both sanctioned and 
non-sanctioned, we take all unemployment spells during the research period, leaving us 
with about 35,000 spells. 
As shown by Manski and Lerman (1977), WESML provides a consistent estimator. 
Each observation is weighted with the ratio between the population fraction and the sam­
ple fraction of the strata it belongs to.  Deﬁne Li  as individual i’s contribution to the 
likelihood function. Then, formally, WESML amounts to maximization of the weighted 
likelihood function 
N S  Q(s)
d(s) lnLw = ∑
 ∑
 Li  (14)
H(s)
 i=1 s=1 
where d(s) is an indicator variable taking the value one if individual i experience outcome 
s, Q(s) the actual fraction of the population selecting alternative s, and H(s) the proba­
bility that an individual selecting alternative s is included in the sample. In our case, we 
have two alternatives: s = 1 if the individual experiences a sanction during the research 
period, and s = 0 otherwise. 
Inference on precision also has to be adjusted. Manski and Lerman (1977) show that 
the appropriate covariance matrix is the familiar sandwich estimator V = A−1BA−1, with 
∂ 2 lnLi  ∂ lnLi  ∂ lnLi A = −E  ( )θ =θ∗  and  B = E  ( )θ=θ ∗ ( )θ =θ∗  .
∂θ∂θ �  ∂θ  ∂θ � 
The WESML estimates are not efﬁcient. Efﬁcient estimators based on endogenously 
stratiﬁed samples are developed in Imbens and Lancaster (1996).  The basic idea is to 
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decide not to pursue this approach.  The reason for this is that our analysis sample will 
be large, and efﬁciency is not a crucial issue. Furthermore, in our case the most efﬁcient 
estimator is to use the full sample of 1.6 million unemployment spells and estimate using 
standard ML. 
6  Results 
6.1  Baseline results 
This subsection presents the baseline estimation results for the Timing of Events model, 
with a sanction effect that is constant over the population and over time.  In the next 
subsection, we investigate the importance of temporal and cross-sectional variation in δ . 
From Subsection 6.3 and onwards we present the results from our full model, testing 
whether a sanction affects the quality of the accepted employment. 
Table 5 presents the parameter estimates of the basic model. In this estimation we use 
the analysis sample presented in Section 4, and estimate the model using WESML. We 
use the individual characteristics listed in Table 2, and a set of inﬂow time dummies as 
observed covariates. As we will not normalize the scale of the unobservables, we have to 
exclude a constant from the regressors and one category from each set of dummies.7  We 
further normalize the two constants in the duration dependence, αs0 = αe0 = 1. 
The parameter of interest is the sanction effect δ .  The estimate of δ is positive and 
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The estimate indicates that a sanction increases the transition 
rate to employment with about 23%.  Compared to other studies on UI sanctions effects 
on the job exit rate this is a rather small effect.  For the Netherlands, Abbring, Van den 
Berg and Van Ours (2005) ﬁnd that a sanction doubles the job exit rate. For Switzerland, 
Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2005) estimate that the job exit rate increases with 
about 25% if a sanction warning is issued and with another 25% if a sanction is actually 
imposed.  For Denmark, Svarer (2007) estimates increases of about 50% for men and a 
7Our base category consists of women, with neither education nor experience in their occupation, who do not 
need guidance, living in the central parts of Sweden, with less than high school education and who started 
their unemployment spell in 1999. 
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Presumably, the institutional settings play a role.  As described in Section 3.2, a system 
of job-offer decision monitoring, like the system in Sweden, places a natural upper bound 
on the sanction effect, because even if all offers are accepted, the job exit rate is bounded 
from above by the job offer arrival rate.  A system where a minimum search effort is 
imposed after a sanction does not give rise to such an upper bound. 
The signs of the regressor effects on both hazards are mostly as expected.  Not sur­
prisingly, we ﬁnd selection on observables.  For example, the dummy for individuals 
with university education generates a negative selection effect:  highly educated unem­
ployed have high re-employment rates and low sanction rates.  Omitting this dummy as 
an explanatory variable would have resulted in underestimation of δ (if it is not captured 
by the unobservables).  Further as expected, is the re-employment rate higher for highly 
educated, and for unemployed which have education in their profession.  The effect of 
the observables on the sanction rate also reveals some interesting patterns.  The gender 
dummy is insigniﬁcant, indicating that discrimination is not important for the sanction 
decision. We also note that the sanction effect is signiﬁcantly lower among older workers. 
Figure 4:  Estimated duration dependence.  Normalized re-employment rate. 
Table 5 also reports the estimates for the baseline hazard as a set of coefﬁcients for 
the polynomials of order one to seven.  In order to provide more intuition behind these 
estimates we have produced two ﬁgures: 6.1 and 6.1, which display the estimated duration 
dependence at daily basis for the exit rate and sanction rate, respectively. Remember that 
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Exit Hazard  Sanction Hazard 
Est.  S.e.  Est.  S.e. 
Sanction eﬀect,δ  0.205  0.035 
Unobserved heterogeneity 
V 1/V 3 
V 2/V 4 
Pr(vu = V 1 ,vs = V 3) 
Pr(vu = V 1 ,vs = V 4) 
Pr(vu = V 2 ,vs = V 3) 














Male  -0.084  0.017  0.075  0.039 
Education in occupation 
























South  -0.007  0.019  -0.191  0.043 
















2000  0.015  0.025  0.165  0.067 
2001  -0.045  0.028  0.147  0.074 
2002  -0.104  0.030  0.377  0.075 



































Notes:  Sample is the selected sample described in the data section.  Estimated using WESML with robust standard 
errors.  The omitted category is:  living in the central parts of Sweden with less than high school education.  Local 
unemployment is the regional unemployment in percent at the time of inﬂow. 
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initially decrease, but after about 150 days of unemployment the exit rate starts to go 
down. For instance, after 600 days in unemployment the re-employment rate is about 30% 
lower compared with at the start of the unemployment period. Apparently, stigmatization 
and discouragement play a signiﬁcant role for individual unemployment durations.  The 
sanction rate gradually rises with time spent in unemployment. After about 300 days the 
maximum sanction rate is attained, and at longer durations there is a tendency towards 
decreased sanction rate.  This is consistent with the fact that sanctions that are imposed 
because of some violation during the unemployment spell cannot be given at the start of 
that spell. 
Figure 5:  Estimated duration dependence.  Normalized sanction rate. 
6.2  Eﬀect heterogeneity 
We now allow the sanction effect to vary over the population.  We ﬁrst specify δ  as a 
function of explanatory variables x, as follows: δ = x�γ, for some parameter vector γ that 
replaces the single effect parameter δ . Since our sample only contains a limited number 
of sanctions, we only include a small number of variables.  We test for heterogeneous 
effects by sex, age, level of education, local unemployment rate, type of sanction regime 
and local sanction volume.  Table 6 presents the estimated sanction effects.  The other 
estimates are very similar as for the basic model, and are therefore not reported. We ﬁnd 
interesting heterogeneous treatment effects: the sanction effect is signiﬁcantly lower for 
males, and signiﬁcantly lower for older unemployed. There is further no difference in the 
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the regional occurrence of sanctions (number of sanctions divided by the number of un­
employed), interacted with the treatment.  If stigma is an important part of the sanction 
effect, the sanction effect should be lower in regions where sanctions are more common. 
However, we ﬁnd no such differences. 
Table 6:  Estimates of heterogenous sanction eﬀect 
Exit Hazard 
Est.  S.e. 
General  0.292  0.142 
Male  -0.202  0.057 
Log(age) 























Notes:  The model also includes controls for observed and unobserved variables.  These estimates can be obtained from 
the  authors  upon  request.  Sample  is  the  selected  sample  described  in  the  data  section.  Estimated  using  WESML 
with  robust  standard  errors.  Local  unemployment  is  the  regional  unemployment  in  percent  at  the  time  of  inﬂow. 
Regional sanction occurrence is the ratio of the annual number of sanctions in the region and the annual mean stock 
of unemployed in the region, times 1000.  Measured at the time of the sanction. 
Next, consider how the monitoring regime affects the sanction effect.  As explained 
in Section 2 the Swedish sanction regime was changed in February, 2001.  The reform 
introduced new, softer, sanctions, which reduced the size of the beneﬁt reduction from 
100% to 25%. The new sanctions may inﬂuence the average sanction effect in two ways. 
First, the new sanctions are softer so that we expect the sanction effect to decrease for 
each individual. Second, the reform increased the sanction volume, implying that unem­
ployed who commits less serious violations are also sanctioned after the reform.  These 
individuals are most likely more sensitive to sanctions, which gives an upward tendency 
in the average sanction effect. The effect of the reform on the average sanction effect is 
therefore theoretically ambiguous. We ﬁnd that the average sanction effect is signiﬁcantly 
higher under the new sanction regime. We draw two conclusions from this result: (i) un­
employed who commits less serious violations are more responsive to sanctions, and (ii) 
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Notes:  δ2  have been multiplied with 100.  The model also includes controls for observed and unobserved variables. 
These estimates can be obtained from the authors upon request.  Sample is the selected sample described in the data 
section.  Estimated using WESML with robust standard errors. 
It is also possible that sanctions have an effect only shortly after they have been im­
posed.  To investigate this we introduce duration dependence in the effect parameter, as 
follows:  exp(δ ) = exp(δ1 + δ2(t − ts)).  If δ2  is negative this means that the sanction 
effect decreases over time. Table 7 reports the estimates of δ1 and δ2. These results indi­
cate very persistent effects of a sanction.  We have multiplied the coefﬁcient for δ2 with 
100.  It means that the average sanction effect on the re-employment hazard after 100 
days is about 19%, compared to 20% directly after the sanction has been imposed. There 
are several potential explanations to this persistent effect. It is reasonable to believe that 
individuals who have experienced a sanction are subject to intensiﬁed monitoring and at­
tention from the case workers. In addition, second time offenders are punished harder, so 
that the persistent effect may be an effect of that the unemployed is eager to avoid future 
sanctions. 
6.3  Job quality 
We now consider the effect of a sanction on characteristics of the subsequent employment. 
From a welfare point of view, as well from the point of view of the unemployed individual, 
any such effects are important.  If the job accepted after a sanction is similar to the job 
accepted in the counterfactual situation of no sanction, then severe sanctions and intensive 
monitoring have less adverse effects than otherwise. 
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Exit Hazard  Sanction Hazard 
Est.  S.e.  Est.  S.e. 
Sanction effect  0.222  0.030 
Unobserved heterogeneity 
V 1/V 3  -4.653  0.146  -5.726  0.345 
V 2/V 4  -3.443  0.147  -5.912  0.338 
Pr(vu = V 1 ,vs = V 3)  0.041 
Pr(vu = V 1 ,vs = V 4)  0.594 
Pr(vu = V 2 ,vs = V 3)  0.062 




Male  -0.090  0.017  0.075  0.038 
Education in occupation  0.227  0.018  0.070  0.041 
Experience in occupation  0.009  0.018  -0.063  0.044 
Needs Guidance  -0.017  0.019  0.014  0.048 
Log(age)  -0.358  0.037  -0.414  0.087 
North  0.230  0.025  -0.099  0.059 
South  -0.002  0.019  -0.189  0.042 
High school Education  0.122  0.021  -0.133  0.046 
University Education  0.061  0.025  -0.632  0.059 
Local unemployment  -0.024  0.007  -0.099  0.017 
Inﬂow time 
2000  0.011  0.024  0.175  0.066 
2001  -0.050  0.028  0.156  0.072 
2002  -0.108  0.029  0.387  0.071 
2003  -0.252  0.028  0.508  0.067 
σ 
Duration dependence 
α1  5.007·10−3  0.973·10−3  9.745·10−3  1.627·10−3 
α2  -34.711·10−6  10.803·10−6  -20.109·10−6  4.757·10−6 
α3  91.232·10−9  50.430·10−9  13.193·10−9  3.799·10−9 
α4  -125.542·10−12  115.532·10−12 
α5  94.318·10−15  135.617·10−15 
α6  -36.398·10−18  77.905·10−18 
α7  5.652·10−21  17.302·10−21 
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Notes: Wage is the full-time monthly wage in SEK, and hours worked an indicator variable taking the value on if it is full-time 
employment and zero otherwise. Sample is the selected sample described in the data section. Estimated using WESML with robust 
standard errors. Local unemployment is the regional unemployment in percent at the time of inﬂow. 
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δh, the sanction effect on the wage and hours worked, respectively.  Our estimates show 
a negative and signiﬁcant (at 1% level) sanction effect on both the wage and on hours 
worked.  A sanction decreases the accepted wage with about 3.8%.  We measure hours 
worked using an indicator variable taking the value one for full-time employment and zero 
otherwise. Recalculated into marginal effects the results in Table 8 imply that a sanction 
increases the probability to accept part-time work with about 10.3 percentage points, or 
15 percent. Part-time work is more often associated with a less secure employment, and 
of course, a lower income.  We therefore interpret the effect on hours worked as a re­
enforced negative effect on the job quality.  It means that a sanction has a quite large 
negative impact on quality of the subsequent job. 
The signs of the regressor effects on both the wage and hours worked are as expected. 
Males receive higher wages compared to women. Unemployed with high school educa­
tion earn about 2% more than unemployed with less than high school education.  The 
corresponding number for unemployed with university education is 11%. We ﬁnd similar 
patterns for hours worked. Males, highly educated, and unemployed in low employment 
areas, tend to ﬁnd full-time employment to a higher degree. This conﬁrms that wage and 
full-time employment both are perceived as attractive job characteristics. 
6.4  Long run eﬀects 
It may be that the sanction effect on the accepted job is a short-term effect, and that those 
who suffer a sanction catch up quickly, say after two or three years.  This would be in 
line with the results in Zijl, Van den Berg and Heyma (2009), who ﬁnd that temporary 
jobs often serve as a stepping-stone into regular work. On the other hand it may also be 
the case that those who suffer a sanction end up on a lower job quality trajectory, with 
long-term or even permanent job quality effects.  Obviously, if there are long run effect 
the negative welfare effects of sanctions are smaller. Investigating the long run effects is 
thus crucial from a policy perspective. 
In order to investigate the long run effects of a sanction we re-estimate our full model 
using the wage and full-time status after two, three and four years instead of the wage and 
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Full sample  Our sample 
Exit to employment observed 
Of which  65.7  65.2 
Observe wage after 1 year  25.7  23.9 
Observe wage after 2 years  21.3  19.8 
Observe wage after 3 years  16.5  15.2 
Monthly wage in SEK after 1 years  19001 (4521)  18952 (4580) 
Monthly wage in SEK after 2 years  19616 (4471)  19545 (4493) 
Monthly wage in SEK after 3 years  20054 (4409)  19942 (4594) 
Full time (≥ 34 hours a week) after 1 year  68.2  67.0 
Full time (≥ 34 hours a week) after 2 years  69.5  68.0 
Full time (≥ 34 hours a week) after 3 years  69.5  65.9 
Notes:  Wage  after  1  year  is  the  observed  wage  1-2  years  after  the  exit,  and  so  on.  Full  sample  is  the  full  sample 
of all unemployment spells, and our sample the selected sample described in the data section.  Standard deviation in 
parenthesis. 
full-time status directly after the exit from unemployment.  We use the same full model 
as speciﬁed in Subsection 5.2, including a normally distributed wage, a logit speciﬁcation 
for the full-time part-time decision, and a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the observed and un­
observed effects in the model. Table 9 presents some descriptive statistics for these long 
run outcomes. Obviously, we cannot observe the wage for those who have left the labor 
market and not for those who once again are unemployed. As expected we therefore ob-
serve less and less wages as time passes on after the exit to employment. It means that we 
estimate these models with some reservations. However, as the wage several years after 
the exit from unemployment is rarely observed, we ﬁnd this exercise meaningful. 
Table 10 presents our long-term job quality estimation results. Here we only present 
the sanction effects, but remember that the models also include the duration until a sanc­
tion, as well as extensive controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.  We ﬁnd 
that sanctions have very persistent job quality effects. Our previous results indicated that 
a sanction decreases the wage directly after the exit from unemployment with 3.8 percent. 
Here, we ﬁnd that this wage effect is 3.4, 4.3 and 4.7 after two, three and four years af­
ter the exit from unemployment, respectively. We ﬁnd similar long run effects for hours 
worked: a sanction has negative and signiﬁcant effect on the probability to get full-time 
employment. We conclude that those who get a sanction do not catch up quickly. From a 
welfare perspective this is an important result. 
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Exit Hazard 
Est.  S.e. 
Wage  Hours worked 




0.035  -0.034  0.010  -0.709  0.146 




0.030  -0.043  0.010  -0.778  0.158 




0.034  -0.047  0.017  -0.530  0.197 
Notes:  Each  panel  (one,  two  and  three  years)  represents  diﬀerent  sets  of  results.  Wage  one  year  after  exit  is  the 
full-time monthly wage in SEK, and hours worked an indicator variable taking the value on if it is full-time employment 
and zero otherwise,  1-2 years after the exit from unemployment,  and so on.  Each model also includes controls for 
observed and unobserved variables.  These estimates can be obtained from the authors upon request.  Sample is the 
selected sample described in the data section.  Estimated using WESML with robust standard errors. 
6.5  Occupational changes 
One can separate out two main explanations for a long run effect.  It could either be 
an effect of the unemployed; (i) accepting a job with a lower occupational level, or (ii) 
accepting a less well paid job within the same occupation.  From a policy perspective, 
separating between these two explanations is important.  If a sanction forces individuals 
to switch into a less qualiﬁed occupation, it imply that these individuals are not able to 
utilize all their education and experience.  It means that on average, acceptance of a job 
with a lower occupational level involves a larger loss of human capital than acceptance of 
a job in the same occupation. This loss becomes irreversible as human capital depreciates 
over time. It may therefore be more difﬁcult for the individual to move out of a bad job 
match if the job has a lower occupational level. This makes it important to know whether 
sanctions often lead to a match in a lower occupational level. 
We use two different approaches to test whether a sanction means that the unem­
ployed accepts a job with a lower occupational level.  In both approaches we utilize the 
occupation codes in our wage survey data.  In the ﬁrst approach we use the four ofﬁcial 
qualiﬁcation levels. They are based on the ”objective” qualiﬁcations required to perform 
each work, and not necessarily on the qualiﬁcations the individuals working in each occu­
pation actually have. As described in Section 4, the different occupations are divided into 
four groups: occupations that require no or limited education, high school competence, 
short university education, and longer university education (3–4 years or more), respec-
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Fraction full  Fraction our  Qualiﬁcation  Years of 
sample  sample  level  schooling 
Professionals  16.9  16.0  4  14.4 
Technicians and associate professionals  12.8  12.9  3  13.2 
Clerks  8.5  8.5  2  11.7 
Service workers and shop sales workers  31.9  33.2  2  11.3 
Skilled agricultural workers and ﬁshery  2.0  1.9  2  10.6 
Craft and related trade workers  10.0  9.4  2  10.9 
Plant and machine operators  9.7  10.2  2  11.0 
Elementary occupations  8.3  7.9  1  10.5 
Exit to employment observed %  65.7  65.2 
Of which observe occupation code %  33.6  31.6 
Notes:  Full sample is the full sample of all unemployment spells, and our sample the selected sample described in the 
data section.  The division of the occupations are based on Statistics Sweden’s SSYK classiﬁcation.  Two categories 
armed forces and managerial occupations are excluded.  The qualiﬁcation level is based on the oﬃcial classiﬁcation, 
based on the qualiﬁcations required to perform the tasks associated with each occupation.  Years of schooling is the 
mean years of schooling among all employed in the occupation group in 2001. 
tively. It allows us to rank each occupation from one to four. In the second approach we 
use register data on the number of years of schooling on every individual in Sweden to 
classify the occupations. Using this education data and the entire wage survey for 2001, 
we calculate the mean number of years of schooling among the individuals employed in 
each occupation. It provides a measure of the qualiﬁcation level of each occupation. We 
perform this classiﬁcation at three different levels: dividing the occupations at one, two 
and three digit level, respectively. 
In order to control for observed and unobserved effects we specify similar models as 
our regular full model.  For the ﬁrst approach we specify an ordered logit model for the 
four qualiﬁcation levels.  For the second approach specify a linear model for the mean 
number of years of schooling for each occupation, and assume that the error term is nor­
mally distributed.  In order to control for selection on unobserved effect we allow for 
correlation between the unobservables in model. We take Vq = βqeVe + βqsVs, where Vq is 
unobserved characteristics in the occupation classiﬁcation measure, and βqe and βqs as for 
the regular full model measure the correlation between the unobservables in the model. 
Table 11 provides descriptive statistics for the occupation data. We show information 
for the 8 groups at the one digit level.8  Column 1 and 2 show the proportion of unem­
8We have excluded work in the armed forces and managerial work. The reason for this is that they are not 
classiﬁed into the four qualiﬁcation levels in SSYK. 
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Exit Hazard 
Est.  S.e. 
Occupation level. 
Est.  S.e. 
Four level oﬃcial classiﬁcation 
Sanction eﬀect  0.136 
Log-Likelihood  -182,041 
0.032  -0.030  0.177 
Classiﬁcation by years of schooling 
Sanction eﬀect one digit  0.256 
Log-Likelihood  -183,391 
0.030  -0.036  0.016 




0.029  -0.038  0.020 




0.028  -0.047  0.026 
Notes: The four panels represents diﬀerent sets of results. Four level oﬃcial classiﬁcations is a ordered logit speciﬁcation 
for the oﬃcial SSYK classiﬁcation of the occupations.  Classiﬁcation by years of schooling classiﬁes the occupations 
by the mean years of schooling among all employed in that group of occupations, either at one, two and three digits 
level.  Each model also includes controls for observed and unobserved variables.  These estimates can be obtained from 
the authors upon request.  Sample is the selected sample described in the data section.  Estimated using WESML with 
robust standard errors. 
ployed entering into each occupation for our sample and the full sample, respectively. 
Column 3 reports the ofﬁcial qualiﬁcation level obtained from SSYK for each group. 
These are the qualiﬁcation levels used in the ﬁrst approach.  From these classiﬁcations 
it is clear that the occupations are primarily distinguished by the education normally re­
quired to perform the work associated with each occupation. Column 4 presents the mean 
number of years of schooling for the individuals employed in each group. Note that the 
difference between these groups is quite small.  One reason for this is the existence of 
separate educational tracks. 
Table 12 presents the estimation results: the upper panel displays the results from ﬁrst 
approach and the lower panel from the second approach. For brevity, we only report the 
sanction effects.  All models indicate a negative effect of a sanction on the qualiﬁcation 
level. The effect is, however, not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst approach model. Most likely, this 
is because these groups are very broadly deﬁned. For the second approach, which utilizes 
the mean years of schooling to classify the occupations, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects.  A 
sanction means that the unemployed on average accept employment within an occupation 
that on average requires 0.036–0.047 less years of schooling. In other words, unemployed 
who experience a sanction on average switch into a slightly less qualiﬁed occupation, 
IFAU – Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality  48 resulting in a loss of human capital.  Because of the existence of separate educational 
tracks, this is likely to be a lower bound of the true loss. 
6.6  An assessment of the design of the monitoring policy 
In Subsection 4.3 we postulated two explanations for the fact that there was no persis­
tent dramatic increase in the occurrence of sanctions after the monitoring policy change. 
It would be a formidable computational task to estimate a duration model with regime 
indicators, because the latter are time-varying over the course of a given spell of unem­
ployment. Moreover, as we have seen, there is no uniform moment in time when observed 
outcomes jump to another level and remain stable afterwards. The occurrence of sanctions 
displays substantial region-speciﬁc ﬂuctuations in the year after the policy change.  For 
these reasons we do not estimate a before/after model.  However, note that the calendar 
time indicators for the inﬂow moment do not display a signiﬁcant difference when com­
paring 2000 to 2001.  Because of this, the ﬁrst-mentioned explanation is the most likely 
explanation:  the policy change was ineffective due to the fact that case workers shun 
away from issuing sanctions more frequently.  This interpretation is consistent with the 
facts that case workers have substantial discretionary power to implement policy guide­
lines, and that their primary task is to help the unemployed to ﬁnd a job.  As a result, 
across our observation window, the monitoring regime does not exert a strong ex ante or 
threat effect. 
One could replace the current Swedish system by a system in which (i) monitoring 
focuses on job search effort instead of job offer decisions, and (ii) monitoring is carried 
out by different individuals than the case worker who provides job search assistance.  It 
is plausible that this would lead to a threat effect on the exit rate to work before punish­
ment and as such would lead to a reduction of unemployment. This is both because with 
(ii) the moral dilemmas that the case workers currently face are avoided, and because 
with (i) the unemployed cannot avoid sanctions by reducing their search effort to zero. 
Moreover, in such an alternative system one may expect less adverse effects of sanctions 
on post-unemployment labor market outcomes than in a system where (i) is not satis­
ﬁed, like in the current system.  Our empirical results show strongly adverse effects on 
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post-unemployment outcomes in the current system. Assuming perfect monitoring after 
a realized punishment, the system with monitoring of job offer decisions entails that pun­
ished individuals now have to accept the jobs they like least, whereas the other system 
entails that punished individuals have to search harder for any possible job.  The jobs 
they like least are the jobs with a low job quality.  If the effects on post-unemployment 
outcomes are adverse in a system with monitoring of offer decisions then they are also 
adverse in the other system, because in both systems, the sanction involves a negative 
income effect. However, the theoretical results imply that the size of these adverse effects 
is larger in the former system than in the latter. 
Conclusions 
We ﬁnd that sanctions have adverse effects on post-unemployment outcomes.  On aver­
age, they cause individuals to accept jobs with a lower hourly wage and less working 
hours per week. The estimated average reduction in the accepted wage is almost 4%. The 
probability to move into full-time employment decreases with about 15%. What is more, 
we provide evidence that post-unemployment outcomes are also affected in the long run. 
Sanctions causally increase the likelihood of the acceptance of a job at a lower occupa­
tional level.  Such decisions are to some extent irreversible, in which case they involve 
a permanent human capital loss.  From a present-value point of view, this means that 
sanctions entail a substantial welfare loss for at least some individuals. 
Concerning the effects of sanctions on the transition rate into work, we ﬁnd a signif­
icant positive effect.  On average, this involves a 23% increase.  Compared to estimates 
for the job exit rate in other studies, this is a rather small effect.  At the same time, the 
Swedish UI sanction rate is much smaller than in most OECD countries. 
We explain our ﬁndings by additional and novel empirical and theoretical analyses, 
and we combine the evidence in order to assess the current Swedish monitoring system. 
First, our empirical examination of the monitoring policy change in our observation win­
dow leads us to conclude that case workers use their substantial discretionary power to 
keep sanction rates low because they feel uncomfortable initiating punishments to their 
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who carry out the day-to-day monitoring have discretionary power and have personal con­
tacts to the individuals to whom they are supposed to issue punishments. In our case, the 
ﬁndings implies that across our observation window, the monitoring regime does not exert 
a strong ex ante (or “threat”) effect. 
Secondly, our theoretical analysis derives implications of the fact that Swedish mon­
itoring is primarily focused on the prevention of job offer rejections.  Such a policy has 
particularly adverse effects on post-unemployment outcomes. Its emphasis on the accep­
tance of all job offers means that individuals are pushed to modify their behavior towards 
the acceptance of low-quality jobs.  In addition, this policy induces some individuals to 
reduce their search effort in order to prevent that they receive job offers. The ex ante ef­
fect of monitoring is then perverse for some individuals, with more monitoring implying 
a lower job exit rate.  We view this as a potentially important insight.  The theoretical 
analysis is also able to explain why the ex post effect on the job exit rate is not very large. 
The system of job offer decision monitoring places a natural upper bound on the sanction 
effect, because even if all offers are accepted, the job exit rate is bounded from above by 
the job offer arrival rate.  And, after a sanction, unemployed workers may reduce their 
effort to zero in order to prevent further job offers and therefore additional punishments. 
We contrast the job offer decision monitoring system to the alternative and more com­
mon system of job search effort monitoring.  The adverse effects of sanctions on post­
unemployment outcomes may be smaller with search effort monitoring, because it pushes 
individuals to search harder for any possible job and not just the jobs with low quality. 
Moreover, search effort monitoring is not compatible with the perverse ex ante effect 
mentioned above, and the ex post effect on the job exit rate is not restricted by the kind of 
upper bound mentioned above. 
Let us consider the potential effects of a switch to a system in which (i) monitoring 
focuses on job search effort instead of job offer decisions, and (ii) monitoring is carried 
out by different individuals than the case worker who provides job search assistance. 
Such a system may lead to a larger threat effect, a larger ex post effect on the job exit 
rate, and a smaller ex post effect on post-unemployment outcomes.  Obviously, a larger 
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be interesting to shed some more light on these issues by studying spatial and temporal 
variations in institutions and outcomes in more detail, but the currently low occurrence of 
sanctions precludes this avenue. We should also note that in very recent years the Swedish 
system has gradually adopted more features of search effort monitoring (OECD, 2007). 
It is, however, important to point out that the policy changes suggested above cannot be 
expected to completely rule out adverse effects on post-unemployment outcomes. After 
all, if those effects are adverse in a system with monitoring of offer decisions then they 
will also be adverse in the other system, because in both systems, the sanction involves a 
negative income effect. 
Our paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation of causal effects 
of rare endogenous events on duration outcomes. We show that WESML with an endoge­
nously stratiﬁed sample containing all treated is a useful estimation method if one has 
access to population-level register data. It allows for a computationally feasible analysis 
and provides estimates with high precision. 
The ﬁnding that individuals move more often to a lower occupational level after a 
sanction may have implications for the more general issue of how steeply beneﬁts should 
decline as a function of the elapsed unemployment duration. Theoretical studies of opti­
mal UI design do not distinguish between jobs in the same occupation (with opportunities 
to mitigate the low starting wage through job-to-job transitions) and jobs with a lower 
occupational level (where long-run opportunities may be less abundant). Such a distinc­
tion may shed a new light on the optimal balance of moral hazard with the likelihood that 
unemployed individuals are driven into sub-optimal job matches. We leave this as a topic 
for further research. 
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